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Summary
South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States.  Korea is the
U.S.’s seventh-largest trading partner — ahead of Western European countries such
as France and Italy — and its sixth-largest export market.  Korea has also become a
significant investment site for American companies, which have poured nearly $20
billion into the country over the past seven years.  In 2003, the U.S. was Korea’s
largest trading partner, and its second-largest export market, source of imports, and
supplier of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Increased economic interaction has been accompanied by numerous
disagreements over trade policies.  The intensity of the disputes has diminished
considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because South Korea has
enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a
$58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near
collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997.  In recent years, the United States
and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing their trade disputes,
so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were in the 1980s and 1990s.  This
is due in part to the quarterly, working-level bilateral trade meetings that were first
held in early 2001. 
This report summarizes the main issues in U.S.-South Korean economic
relations, including South Korea’s economic prospects and economic reforms, and
major bilateral economic disputes.  The report will be updated periodically.
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South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: 
Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects
The United States and South Korea (known formally as the Republic of Korea,
or ROK) have been allies since the United States intervened in 1950 and fought the
Korean War to prevent a North Korean invasion from taking over South Korea.  Over
33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year
conflict.  In 1954, a year after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice
agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty,
which provides that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will
act to meet the common danger.  The United States maintains about 37,000 troops
in the ROK to supplement the 650,000-strong South Korean armed forces.  
Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth in South Korea propelled it into
the ranks of the world’s largest industrialized countries.  For over a decade, South
Korea has been one of the United States’ largest trading partners.  Economic growth
also has helped transform the ROK into a mid-level regional power that can influence
U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, particularly the United States’ approaches toward
North Korea and China.  
Overview of U.S.-South Korean Economic Relations
In 2003, trade between the South Korea and the United States was nearly $60
billion, making South Korea the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner —
ahead of France and Italy — and its seventh-largest export market.  (See Table 2.)
For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean market is even more
important, ranking number five for California’s exporters, number two for Oregon’s
exporters, and number four for all U.S. agricultural exporters.  Major U.S. exports
to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery (particularly semiconductor
production machinery), aircraft, agricultural products, and beef.  South Korea is
among United States’ largest markets for agricultural products and beef. 
South Korea at a Glance
C Head of State: President Roh
Moo-hyun
C Population: 48.3 million
C Life Expectancy:  75 years 
C Literacy Rate: 98%
C Ethnicity: 100% Korean
C Size: slightly larger than
Indiana
C Arable Land: 19% 
C Nominal GDP: $605 billion
(2003); world’s 12th-largest
economy
C Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$12,585 (2003)
C Exports: $194 billion (2003)
C Imports: $179 billion (2003)
Source:  The World Factbook 2002; DRI-WEFA; ROK Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy
CRS-2
South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the
United States is on South Korea.  In 2003, the United States was Korea’s number one
trading partner, and its second-largest export market, source of imports, and supplier
of foreign direct investment.  In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United
States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number one export market.  










 ROK ranks #7 #7 #7 n.a.
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In 2003, China surpassed the U.S. as the ROK’s largest export
market.  For the first four months of  2004, China surpassed the
U.S. as the ROK’s largest trading partner.
Increased economic interaction has been accompanied by numerous
disagreements over trade policies.  The intensity of the disputes has diminished
considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because South Korea has
enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a
$58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near
collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In particular, as a result of the
reforms, South Korea has opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions
of dollars of foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI).  The result is that
foreign companies, including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many
prominent industrial conglomerates (chaebol), own an estimated 40% of the value
of the shares traded on South Korea’s stock exchange, and own about one-third of
the Korean banking industry.  South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, elected to one
five-year term in 2002, has said that more extensive reforms are needed to help
accomplish his goals of raising per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to $20,000
and of transforming South Korea into an major economic hub in Northeast Asia.
The United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at
managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were
in the 1980s and 1990s.  This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level “trade
action agenda” trade meetings that were first initiated in early 2001.  Both sides
credit the meetings, which appear to be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade
relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue by serving as “action-
forcing” events.  The most recent meeting occurred in early June 2004.
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Table 2.  Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade








1990 14.40 18.49 -4.09 32.89
1995 25.38 24.18 1.20 49.56
1999 22.04 31.15 -9.11 53.19
2000 26.30 39.83 -13.53 66.13
2001 20.89 34.92 -14.03 55.81
2002 21.15 35.28 -14.13 56.43
2003 22.52 36.93 -14.41 59.45
Jan-Apr 2003 7.43 11.36 -3.93 18.79
Jan-Apr 2004 7.91 13.71 -5.80 21.62
Sources: 1990-1998 data from Global Trade Information Services.  1999-
2003 data from U.S. International Trade Commission.
South Korea’s Economy
The 1997 Crisis and IMF-Directed Reforms
South Korea’s 1997 financial crisis was a seminal event in the country’s history.
During the autumn of 1997 — spurred in part by the bankruptcy of some major
industrial conglomerates (chaebol) and a sharp increase in repayments required on
short-term foreign debt — investors lost confidence in the economy and capital fled
the country.  The Korean won lost half its value in the space of a few days, tumbling
from 900 to 1900 won to the dollar.  In a futile attempt to prop up the currency, the
government’s foreign currency reserves dropped to $4 billion, an amount insufficient
to carry the country through another day.  Following the collapse of Hanbo Steel in
January 1997, six of the country’s top 30 chaebol went bankrupt.  In December 1997,
barely a year after joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Seoul turned to the IMF for economic assistance.  At virtually
the same time, South Koreans elected longtime democracy activist Kim Dae Jung to
the presidency, the first time since the early 1960s that an opposition leader had won
the country’s highest office.
After negotiating for weeks over the details, on December 4, 1997, South Korea
and the IMF agreed to a $58 billion support package.  In return, Seoul agreed to
tighten its fiscal and monetary policies and engage in far-reaching, market-oriented
reforms of its financial and corporate sectors, and of its labor market policies.  South
Korea also agreed to open its economy further to foreign goods and investors.  The
newly-elected Kim government adopted most of the structural reforms as its own.
Following the financial crisis, South Korea entered into a severe recession.
Gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.7% and unemployment nearly
quadrupled, rising to 7.6% in 1998.  The slowdown generated substantial anti-IMF
and anti-American sentiment among many South Koreans.  The economy rebounded
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1  In August 2001, Seoul paid off the last of the $19.5 billion it had borrowed from the IMF.
Figure 1.  ROK Real GDP Growth, 1995-2004
in 1999 and 2000, growing  by over 10% and 9%, respectively, and enabling the
South Korean government to rapidly retire many of the debts it incurred in 1997.1
In 2001, however, growth slowed considerably, dragged down by a combination of
internal and external developments, including a decline in consumer and business
confidence, due in part to a perception that the post-crisis restructuring drive was
faltering; the bursting of Korea’s stock market bubble; rising oil prices; and a sharp
falloff in exports to the United States and Japan, which entered economic downturns
of their own. The government responded by lowering interest rates, unveiling an
economic stimulus package, and easing the rules on the use of credit cards.  
These measures boosted consumer spending, which helped to double the growth
rate from 3.1% in 2001 to 6.3% in 2002.  Growth also was boosted by rapid
economic integration with China.  Domestic investment, however, remained low.
Recent Economic Developments
In 2003, overuse of personal credit cards led to the near-collapse of many
financial firms and a sharp slowdown in economic growth, which fell back to 3.1%.
Until the late 1990s, the consumer sector of the economy had been largely untapped,
with Korean lenders focusing on the corporate sector.  Thus, when the government
liberalized financial regulations and forced Korea’s giant conglomerates to curtail
their borrowing in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, banks and other financial
institutions turned to consumers — at times recklessly — as a new source of profit.
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2  Hye-Seung Seo, “South Korea Unveils Program To Help Ease Consumer Debt,” The Asian
Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2004.
3  Gordon Fairclough, “South Korea Forecasts Growth Of Near 6% on Export Strength,” The
Asian Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2004.
4  Francesco Guerrera, et. al., “Seoul Plans to Sell Most of Stake in Hana Bank,” Financial
Times, January 28, 2004.
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, South Korea Country Report, May 2004, p. 32.
The number of credit card holders behind in their payments has increased sharply,
with an estimated 8% of the population in default as of March 2004.2  In 2003 and
2004, all eight of Korea’s specialized credit-card issuers registered massive losses
that collectively were more than double their assets.  In most cases, insolvency was
avoided only through bailouts and takeovers by affiliated members of the companies’
respective chaebol groupings.  Most of these moves appear to have been engineered,
regulatorally enabled, and/or encouraged by the government, which feared a collapse
of the financial system if the firms were allowed to fail.  The government has
responded to the household debt crisis by tightening restrictions on credit card use
and issuance, and by initiating a refinancing and forgiveness program for individual
debtors.  
For 2004, South Korea’s finance minister has said that he expects South Korea’s
economy to rise by close to 6%, as a powerful surge in exports offsets lackluster
domestic demand.3  Private economic forecasters tend to echo this prediction, though
the sharp rise in oil prices may curtail growth, as South Korea imports all of its oil.
Economic Reforms
Financial Sector and Chaebol Reforms.  Assessing Korea’s economic
reforms to date depends on one’s perspective.  If the point of comparison is the
Korean economy in 1997, then the government’s progress has been impressive.
South Korea’s economy today is far more transparent, open to foreign investors, and
efficient than it was seven years ago.  Progress has been particularly notable in
opening the country to foreign direct investment (see below) and in reforming the
financial sector.  In the years following the crisis, the government spent about $140
billion to bail out ailing banks and mutual funds.4  This amount is approximately
25%-30% of the country’s GDP, nearly twice the level required to save Mexico’s
financial system during its crisis in 1995.  Notably, predictions that the government
would have to spend substantially more funds have not come to pass, and Korea’s
banking sector as a whole has returned to profitability.  By the end of 2001, non-
performing loans (loans which are unlikely to be repaid) had fallen to 2.4% of total
loans, compared with 16.4% in 1998.  Since 2001, the Korean banking sector as a
whole has been profitable.  At the end of 2003, the percentage of troubled loans had
risen to 2.6%, primarily as a result of the collapse of the credit card bubble.5  (In
2001, the percentage of non-performing loans for large banks in the United States
was 1.5%.)  Critics point out that the official South Korean percentage
underestimates the problem because many South Korean loans that are unlikely to be
repaid have not yet been classified as “non-performing.”
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6 Foreigners also are significant shareholders in many prominent chaebol and own an
estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on South Korea’s stock exchange.
7 SK Global (now SK Networks)was found to have window-dressed its financial statements
by over 7 trillion won (around $5.8 billion), for which several senior level executives,
including SK Corp’s chairman were convicted of breaching fiduciary responsibilities.  The
chairman served a three-month prison term.  Following SK Global’s restatement of its
earnings, SK Corp led a rescue of its subsidiary despite the objections of most of SK Corp’s
foreign shareholders.
The Roh government has accelerated South Korea’s efforts to re-privatize the
banks that were nationalized in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis.  By 2000, the
nationalization program had brought about one-third of the banking industry’s assets
into government hands, and state ownership of the banking sector formed the crux
of a major trade dispute with the United States and European Union, in which state-
owned and state-controlled banks were accused of illegally subsidizing Hynix
Semiconductor Inc., the world’s third-largest producer of dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips.  By the spring of 2004, however, sales of
many of formerly state-owned banks had given foreign companies collectively a
major stake in South Korea’s financial sector, notwithstanding occasional statements
by Korean politicians expressing misgivings about excessive non-Korean ownership.
Currently, foreigners own about one-third of the assets in the Korean banking sector,
including majority stakes in four of Korea’s eight nation-wide banks.6  In March
2004, Korea’s Financial Supervisory Commission approved a $1.7 billion bid from
Citigroup for a controlling stake in KorAm, Korea’s seventh-largest bank.  Citigroup
plans to operate in South Korea under  its own name. 
If the yardstick used to assess South Korea’s reforms is the U.S. economy,
however, it becomes clear that Seoul has far to go if it is to make the economy truly
responsive to market-oriented pressures and incentives.  Progress has been
particularly difficult in the government’s attempts to pressure the chaebol to correct
the problems revealed by the 1997 crisis, including excessively high debt levels, a
heavy reliance on short-term debt, the lack of transparency, weak corporate
governance, and corporate structures dominated by individual families rather than
professional business managers.  Although two of the largest chaebol — Daewoo and
Hyundai — have been dismantled and debt-equity ratios for most of the top
conglomerates have been reduced, corporate governance and cross-shareholdings
within chaebol groupings remain major problems.  The bailouts of struggling credit
card affiliates in 2003 and 2004 seemed to many to indicate that the chaebol had not
reformed their past practices of  forcing their profitable enterprises to rescue failing
ones.  Also in 2003, a massive accounting scandal at SK Global, the trading unit of
the country’s fourth-largest chaebol, SK Group, revealed similar structural
problems.7 
Additionally, the reckless credit card lending activities of Korean credit card
firms exposed the continued weaknesses in risk management and due diligence by
Korean financial interests.  One of the government’s responses has been to accelerate
plans to further restructure the financial industry by passing new laws allowing the
consolidation of banking, insurance, asset management, and brokerage services.
Some critics, however, worry that this cross-sectoral consolidation will accentuate
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8 In a March 4, 2004 speech to the American Chamber of Commerce of Korea, Minister of
Finance and Economy Lee Hun-jai announced the new policy, saying, “foreign direct
investment is important not just for short-term recovery of the Korean economy, but also for
supporting longer-term growth potential.”  Andrew Ward, “Korea Moves to Win Back
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Figure 2.  Foreign Direct Investment Flows into the ROK,
1993-2003
the problem of cross-shareholding within chaebol groupings.  Additionally, the
recent bailouts of the two largest credit card companies, LG Card and Samsung Card,
have raised fears that the “too big to fail” dynamic continues to persist in South
Korea.
Foreign Direct Investment Reforms.  As part of its commitment to the
IMF in December 1997, Seoul pledged to eliminate most restrictions on foreign
firms’ long-term investments in local subsidiaries and controlling interests in local
companies.  The government of President Kim Dae Jung, who was elected during the
nadir of Korea’s financial crisis, moved aggressively to liberalize Korea’s foreign
investment regime.  Partly as a response to Kim’s reforms, and partly in response to
the lower prices of Korean assets following the 1997 crisis, FDI flows increased
markedly, soaring from $3.2 billion in 1996 to a peak of $15.7 billion in 2000.  Since
then, FDI has declined significantly, falling to $6.5 billion in 2003.  In 2004,
President Roh Moo-hyun’s government began a policy of boosting FDI as a source
of domestic growth.8  Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S. companies
have totaled nearly $20 billion.  (See Figure 2.)  A number of high-profile Korean
companies have been taken over by foreign interests, notably General Motors’
purchase of Daewoo Motors in 2002.  Citigroup’s $1.7 billion purchase of KorAm
in March 2004 was the largest foreign direct investment in Korean history.
Despite the increased openness to foreign ownership, a number of high-profile
acquisitions by foreign companies have been either delayed or cancelled, due to
nationalistic objections to the sale, disagreements over the sales price, and/or the
discovery of previously undisclosed debts owed by the target Korean company.
These delaying actions often have backfired, resulting in far lower eventual sale
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Figure 3.  ROK Trade with U.S., China, & Japan, 2001-
2003
prices.  A case in point was the protracted sale of Daewoo Motors.  In June 2000,
Daewoo Motor’s creditors, many of them government-owned or controlled, reached
a tentative agreement with Ford, which bid nearly $7 billion for the company.
Negotiations became difficult, and after discovering billions of dollars in previously
hidden liabilities (and taking a large loss from the Firestone tire recall), Ford
withdrew its offer.  General Motors, which initially had bid $4 billion, remained the
only viable suitor.  Negotiations with creditors and the government dragged on for
over a year and a half, however.  Finally, in May 2002, GM and Daewoo’s creditors
signed an agreement, by which GM acquired a controlling stake in Daewoo Motors
for $400 million.
South Korea’s Increased Economic Integration with China
South Korea currently is experiencing a “China boom.”  As mentioned earlier,
in 2003 China surpassed the United States as South Korea’s number one export
market.  Many, if not most, of South Korean exports to China are intermediate goods
used in the production of finished goods that ultimately are exported from China to
other countries, including the United States.  A growing number of Koreans are
studying the Chinese language and traveling to China, and public opinion polls show
that a growing number of Koreans have favorable views of China.  These
developments, combined with a sharp decline in favorable views of the United States,
have led many American observers to worry that Chinese influence over South
Korean policy is likely to rise in the future, at the expense of the United States.  
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Many South Koreans, however, have ambivalent views of China’s growing
economic importance.  The increased competitiveness of many Chinese
manufacturers has caused some consternation in some South Korean firms, pushing
them to search overseas for lower-cost production bases.  There are concerns that
jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector, will be lost to Chinese workers as
South Korean foreign direct investment in China increases.
Improved Inter-Korean Economic Relations 
The worsened economic situation for many South Korean small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) is thought to be a major factor propelling President Roh
Moo-hyun’s economic initiatives with North Korea.  In particular, the inter-Korean
industrial zone in Kaesong, North Korea, just north of the demilitarized zone
separating the two countries, is explicitly designed for use by SMEs, over 1,000 of
which reportedly have expressed interest in participating.  A pilot site at Kaesong,
housing the factories of up to ten South Korean firms, is due to open in 2004. 
In the past two years, South Korea has emerged as North Korea’s second-most
important economic partner, after China. Inter-Korean trade has risen by about 80%
since 2001, to about $724 million in 2003.  Since 1994, South Korea has given nearly
$3 billion worth of economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea, perhaps
surpassing China as Pyongyang’s top source of food aid in 2003.  Some analysts
worry that improved inter-Korean economic relations are undermining the Bush
Administration’s policy of constricting the inflows of foreign currency that are
thought to go to the North Korean elite, providing a critical base of support for North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il.  Alternatively, coordinated U.S. and South Korean
policies could use economic leverage to pressure North Korea.  South Korean
government officials reportedly have stated that resolving the ongoing North Korean
nuclear crisis is a prerequisite for starting any “new” inter-Korean economic
programs, presumably including the expansion of the Kaesong site beyond the pilot
program.
Major U.S. Trade Disputes with South Korea
Given the disparities in size and economic dependence, it is not surprising that
the United States typically sets the agenda of U.S.-ROK trade talks.  Since the 1997
financial crisis, these complaints have tended to be directed at regulations
promulgated by “domestic” ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare
and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, that traditionally have had little contact
with foreign governments or firms.  One element of the U.S. strategy toward Korea
appears to be attempting to raise the pressure on these ministries by pushing for the
Korean Cabinet to focus on the issue. 
In general, U.S. exporters and trade negotiators identify the lack of transparency
of Korea’s trading and regulatory systems as the most significant barriers to trade
with Korea, in almost every major product sector.  In 2004, the transparency issue
became a standalone item in the quarterly trade action agenda meetings.  Many U.S.
government officials also complain that Seoul continues to use government
CRS-10
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10  “U.S., Korea Reach Deal on Single Standard for Cell Phone Technology,” Inside US
Trade, April 30, 2004.
11 USTR, “Results of 2004 Section 1377 Review of Telecommunications Trade
Agreements,” p. 5.
regulations to discriminate against foreign firms in politically sensitive industries,
such as automobiles and consumer electronics.  Another major cross-sectoral
complaint is that restrictions in the Korean labor market, such as mandatory
severance pay, raise the cost of investing and doing business.  Finally, the United
States and other countries have pressed South Korea to open further its agricultural
market, which is among the most closed in the OECD.9 
Below are brief descriptions of several major sector-specific disputes between
the U.S. and South Korea. 
Telecommunications.  In recent years, telecommunications has emerged as
one of the most contentious trade issues between the United States and South Korea.
South Korea has one of the world’s highest rates of Internet usage, and cell-phone
use is ubiquitous.  The Roh government has designated next-generation mobile
communications as one of ten “new growth engines” that will help Korea reach
President Roh’s goal of nearly doubling per capita GDP to $20,000 by the end of the
decade.   Perhaps to this end, the Korean government has attempted to set mandatory,
single-technology standards for wireless telecommunications services.  These efforts
led USTR in April 2004 to name South Korea as a “key country of concern” in its
annual report under Section 1377, which requires USTR to assess U.S. trading
partners’ compliance with international telecommunication agreements.
Specifically, for two years, USTR negotiated with the South Korean government
over the Ministry of Information and Communication’s (MoIC) plan to require all
cell phone services to use only the so-called wireless Internet platform for
interoperability (WIPI) for downloading information from the Internet.  WIPI is a
new platform developed by a Korean association funded by Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), a government-funded institute. The
requirement would have excluded users and developers of other operability
platforms, such as the platform developed by San Diego-based Qualcomm, which is
used by a leading Korean cellular service provider.  In April 2004, Seoul and
Washington announced they had reached a compromise that allows MoIC to
implement WIPI, but also permits cellular phones to be made compatible with other
standards.10 
A similar dispute is over MoIC’s plan to issue a mandatory standard — to be
located in the 2.3 gigahertz (GHz) bandwidth spectrum — in 2004 for portable
wireless Internet services (“Wi-Fi”) used to transmit information from the Internet
to laptops and other wireless equipment.  USTR and U.S. companies have charged
that, under the influence of ETRI, the standard is being developed to deliberately
exclude foreign companies in favor of Samsung.11  In the June quarterly trade
meeting, South Korean trade officials reportedly told their U.S. counterparts that
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12 June 2004 conversation with a participant in the talks.
13 Super 301 (Section 310 of the 1974 Trade Act) requires the USTR to report to congress
on “priority foreign countries” that practice unfair trade and “priority practices” that have
the greatest effect on restricting U.S. exports.  If agreement is not reached on the priority
practices, the USTR is required to initiate a Section 301 case (see the following footnote).
For more information, see Wayne Morrison, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, CRS
Report 98-454. 
14 Section 301 (sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974) authorize the USTR to initiate
investigations of foreign trade practices that allegedly discriminate against U.S. commerce.
If a settlement with the foreign country is not reached following the initiation of the
investigation, the USTR decides whether or not to retaliate, usually in the form of 100%
tariffs on selected imports from the offending country.  See CRS Report 98-454, Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: Its Operation and Issues Involving its Use by the
United States, by Wayne Morrison.
15 By way of comparison, the U.S. tariff on passenger vehicles is 2.5%.  The Japanese tariff
rate is 0%. 
Seoul would no longer mandate a Korean standard, but instead would mandate an
international draft standard that Samsung participated in creating.  Most U.S.
companies seeking to enter the Korean market use a rival standard.12
Automotive Trade.  South Korea, the world’s fourth-biggest producer of
automobiles, has long maintained a variety of barriers to the import of automobiles.
The ban on Japanese automobiles was eliminated in 1999.  In its October 1997 Super
301 report to Congress, the Clinton Administration designated Korea as a “Priority
Foreign Country” for its barriers to foreign motor vehicles.13  USTR subsequently
initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as
amended, and issued a call for bilateral consultations to provide fair market access
for foreign autos in Korea.14  In 1998, the U.S. and South Korea signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on foreign access to Korea’s auto market,
which led the USTR to terminate the Section 301 investigation.  Under the MOU,
Seoul agreed to reduce its tariffs on motor vehicles from 80% to 8%,15 proactively
address instances of anti-import activity in Korea, lower or eliminate many
automobile taxes, create a new financing system to make it easier to purchase
automobiles, and streamline its standards and certification procedures.  Many of these
steps — including lowering tariffs — have been implemented, and in 2002 General
Motors purchased the Daewoo Motor Company from the bankrupt Daewoo
conglomerate.  The United States, however, continues to protest that South Korean
tax and regulatory practices have discriminated against imports of foreign
automobiles.
Despite these efforts, imports of foreign automobiles totaled less than 20,000
in 2003 — including 4,460 U.S. cars — less than 2% of the South Korean market.
(See Table 3.)  In contrast, South Korean auto manufacturers exported over 630,000
cars to the United States in 2003.  Nearly all of these vehicles were produced by
Hyundai Motors.  Automotive trade continues to be a perennial issue in the quarterly
trade talks, during which U.S. officials argue that Korean tax and regulatory practices
continue to discriminate against imports.  USTR is pushing South Korea to lower its
8% tariff and has protested that South Korea’s tariff, tax, and regulatory structure
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unfairly penalize automobiles with larger-sized engines.  Specifically, the Bush
Administration has called on Korea to move from engine displacement taxation to
a value-based taxation system, because the former assesses higher taxes on larger
vehicles.16  Periodically, some Members of Congress have introduced legislation
calling on South Korea to end the practices that impede foreign market access and
requesting various U.S. executive agencies to monitor Korea’s progress on this issue.
Two initiatives were H.Con.Res. 144 and S.Con.Res. 43, introduced in the 107th
Congress, in May 2001.
Table 3.  U.S.-ROK Automotive Trade
Vehicular Units, including Light Trucks; Rounded to Nearest 100 Unit
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Korean Auto Companies’
Exports to the U.S.
329,600 473,400 618,300 650,300 637,700




2,400 4,400 7,700 16,100 19,500
Market Share 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 1.3% 1.9%
U.S. Auto Companies’
Exports to Korea 1,400 1,700 2,000 4,700 4,100
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce
In 2002, Hyundai Motors announced it would build a $1 billion plant in
Montgomery, Alabama.  The facility, which is scheduled to begin production in
March 2005, is expected to produce 300,000 vehicles annually and will employ
approximately 2,000 workers.17 
South Korea’s Alleged Currency Manipulation.  In recent years, South
Korea has been criticized for intervening in foreign currency markets by purchasing
U.S. dollar assets to artificially lower the value of the Korean won against the U.S.
dollar in order to boost exports.  As Figure 4 shows, the won generally has been
appreciating against the dollar since 2002.  In response, South Korean authorities
have intervened episodically to slow the won’s rise, though the scale of the
intervention has been far less than Japan’s and China’s.  The United States made
currency intervention a major issue at the APEC Finance Ministers and G-7 Finance
Ministers meetings in September 2003. Shortly thereafter, South Korea appears to
have momentarily eased off its interventionist policies.  Also in September,
congressional criticism of Korea’s currency policy increased.  S. 1592 (The Fair
Currency Enforcement Act of 2003) was introduced, calling on the U.S. government
to monitor and take action against specific countries, including South Korea, that are
“engaged most egregiously in currency manipulation.”
CRS-13
18  Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, “Major Foreign Holders of
Treasury Securities,” [http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt].  Japan held $646 billion in U.S.
treasury securities, the United Kingdom $163 billion, and China $152 billion.
19  “Special 301” refers to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974.  Since the start of the
Special 301 provision in 1989, the USTR has issued annually a three-tier list of countries
judged to have inadequate regimes for IPR protection, or to deny access: 1) priority foreign
countries are deemed to be the worst violators, and are subject to Section 301 investigations
and possible trade sanctions; 2) priority watch list countries are considered to have major
deficiencies in their IPR regime, but do not currently warrant a Section 301 investigation;
and 3) watch list countries, which maintain IPR practices that are of particular concern, but
do not yet warrant higher level designations.  See Wayne Morrison, Section 301 of the Trade
















Source:  Bank of Korea.  Note that Y-axis is inverted.
Average Closing Rate, Longer Frequency
 
Figure 4.  Won:Dollar Exchange Rate, 1997-2004
In the future, the U.S. dollar and the market for U.S. treasury securities could
be affected by South Korea’s plan to give over $100 billion of its foreign-exchange
reserves to private asset-management firms by 2012.  The stated goals of the
program, which is due to begin in 2005, are to invest South Korean foreign currency
holdings more effectively, and to boost President Roh Moo-hyun’s efforts to turn
Korea into a major financial and commercial hub in Northeast Asia.  As of the end
of April 2004, South Korea was the tenth largest foreign holder of U.S. treasury
securities, holding $39.3 billion.18
Intellectual Property Rights Issues.  Bilateral tensions often have arisen
over U.S. allegations that Korea does not sufficiently protect intellectual property
rights (IPRs).  Since becoming a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in
1994, USTR has moved Korea back and forth between the Special 301 “priority
watch list” and the “watch list.”19  Most recently, in January 2004, Korea was
elevated to the “priority watch list” in part because of Seoul’s alleged reluctance to
prevent the growth of online music piracy and continued piracy of U.S. motion
pictures.  The South Korean government has protested this move.  Perhaps in
response to the U.S. action, in May 2004 then-acting South Korean President Goh
Kun launched a “Pan-Government Comprehensive Plan For IPR Protection” to be
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(continued...)
Figure 5.  Steel Imports from
Korea, 1997-2003
headed by a Han Duk-soo, a prominent official who will have a seat in the Cabinet
to promote the initiative.  Both sides report that progress was made in the spring of
2004 on the issue of motion picture piracy.
Rice.  The United States is trying to increase exports of U.S. rice into South
Korea.  The South Korean government controls the purchase, distribution, and end-
use of all imported rice.  During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
(1986-1993), South Korea was granted a 10-year grace period before opening its rice
market to imports.  In return for receiving this concession, South Korea agreed to
allow minimum access for rice through the use of quotas.  The grace period ends in
2005.  South Korea has notified the WTO that it wishes to extend the minimum
access quota system rather than convert to tariffs.  Under the Uruguay Round
agreement, Seoul can do this only if it obtains the consent of other WTO members,
which can demand concessions to expand market access.  U.S. officials reportedly
are prepared to agree to a continuation of the minimum access system in exchange
for an expansion of the overall quota, an end to the ban on imported rice being sold
directly to Korean consumers, and/or a guarantee that the United States would be
given a minimum share of the quota.  China and Thailand, two other parties to the
rice negotiations, reportedly wish to see an end of the quota system in favor of
tariffication, which presumably would be more advantageous to lower-cost rice
producers such as themselves.  In 2003, U.S. exporters sold 55,000 metric tons (MT)
of rice — or about 28% of the 200,000 MT minimum access quota — to South
Korea, behind China’s exports of 115,000 MT.20  
Steel.  From 1998 through 2003,
South Korean steel exports to the United
States were one of the most politically
charged items on the bilateral economic
agenda, particularly since the 1997 Asian
financial crisis.  From 1997 to 1998, Korean
shipments of steel to the U.S. nearly
doubled, vaulting South Korea into the top
five U.S. sources of steel imports.  In 2003,
imports from South Korea declined below
pre-crisis levels, helping to defuse the issue.
In the preceding five years, a number of
anti-dumping cases were initiated against
South Korean exporters, and Presidents
Clinton and Bush each granted safeguard
relief (under Section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974) for U.S. steel producers.21   Korea
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injury to a domestic industry.  The relief is intended to give the domestic industry an
opportunity to adjust to the new competition and remain competitive.  Within six months
after a Section 201 petition has been filed with the International Trade Commission, the ITC
must conduct an investigation, determine if relief is warranted, and recommend appropriate
remedial action from a specified range of options.  The President then decides whether to
implement the recommended measure, apply an alternative measure, or take no action at all.
22 For more on the steel Section 201 case, see CRS Report RL32333, Steel: Price and
Availability Issues, by Stephen Cooney.
23 American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Improving Korea’s Business Climate 2002,
p. 148.
and other countries challenged both Section 201 actions at the World Trade
Organization, which ultimately ruled that the actions were inconsistent with global
trading rules.  In December 2003, partly in response to one of these WTO panel
rulings, President Bush terminated the safeguard tariffs he had established in March
2002.22  In 2000, Korea also won a major WTO case involving anti-dumping duties
the U.S. imposed against Korean exports of stainless steel plate in coils and stainless
steel sheet and strip. 
Assistance to Hynix Semiconductor.  In 2001, a major trade dispute
erupted between the United States and South Korea over allegations that the Seoul
government was propping up Hynix Semiconductor, presently the world’s third-
largest producer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips.
In 2001 and 2002, Hynix’s leading creditors — most of which were owned by the
Korean government — orchestrated a series of rescue packages that kept Hynix in
business by enabling it to restructure its 8.6 trillion won (over $7 billion) in debt. In
the U.S., Micron Technology, the Idaho-based second largest producer of DRAMs,
led a campaign against the support packages, arguing that they amounted to
government-sponsored bailouts that allow Hynix to export at low prices and that they
were a prime cause of the drastic plunge in global chip prices in 2001 and 2002.
Micron, the last U.S.-based DRAM producer, eventually filed a countervailing duty
case, which it won, resulting in a 44% punitive tariff being assessed against Hynix’s
exports to the United States.  In a similar case, the European Union imposed a 34%
counter-vailing duty against Hynix.  Korea has challenged both rulings in the WTO.
A WTO panel has been formed and is due to issue a ruling later this year.
Semiconductors are the second-largest U.S. import from (and largest export to)
Korea. 
Pharmaceuticals.  Korea is ranked in the world’s top 15 pharmaceutical
markets, with annual sales in the $4 billion range.  In 2001, imports comprise
approximately 30% of the total market, compared with an average of 50%-70% for
countries that do not have a significant research-based domestic industry.  Korea’s
expenditures on pharmaceutical products is about $115 per person, less than half the
$240 average for OECD countries.23  The country has a nationalized health insurance
system, which has had a negative cash flow since 1995.  For years, the U.S.
government has raised complaints about a number of Korea’s pharmaceutical
policies, which it describes as “onerous,” non-science based, and designed to protect
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the domestic Korean industry.24  Criticisms have mounted since 2001, when the
Korean government began to implement a series of emergency measures to fill the
national health insurance fund’s mounting deficit, estimated at the time to be over 4
trillion won ($3.3 billion).  Recent complaints include the lack of transparency of the
Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, particularly the Ministry’s allegedly poor
record on consulting with and notifying companies about regulatory changes; poor
protection of intellectual property rights for medical patents; and the discriminatory
nature of Seoul’s requirements that foreign drugs must be retested on Koreans living
in Korea, rather than on other ethnic Asians, as the U.S. has insisted.  In a sign of
pharmaceuticals’ growing importance on the bilateral trade agenda, in January 2002,
the two sides established a bilateral private sector health care reform working group.
South Korea’s Performance in the Doha Development Agenda.   In
the current round of multilateral trade talks, the Doha Development Agenda, although
USTR Robert Zoellick has praised South Korea for attempting to bridge the
difference between the developed and developing countries, Seoul also has been
criticized for resisting agricultural liberalization in the negotiations.  Korea’s tariffs
on agricultural products, except rice, average 66%, compared with a 7.5% average
for tariffs on industrial products.25
Korea’s Complaints Against U.S. Anti-Dumping and CVD Practices.
For over a decade, South Korea has chafed at the United States’ use of anti-dumping
and counter-vailing duty (CVD) laws to raise tariffs on Korean exports.  According
to one study, in July 2000 the five CVD and 18 anti-dumping orders against South
Korean exports covered approximately $2.5 billion, or over 7%, of U.S. imports from
South Korea in 1999.  Moreover, these tariff hikes have tended to be concentrated in
a handful of Korean industries — semiconductors, steel, televisions, and
telecommunications equipment — that have considerable political influence in Seoul.
During the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT, the WTO’s predecessor organization), Korea was one of several
countries demanding revisions to global anti-dumping rules, changes the United
States opposed because of fears they would constrain U.S. anti-dumping
investigators.  South Korea, joined most prominently by Japan, has taken up this
issue again in the Doha Development Agenda talks, against U.S. opposition.26  
In recent years, Seoul has become more assertive in using the WTO to challenge
United States’ trade practices.  In 1999 and 2000, Seoul took the U.S. to the WTO
over allegedly discriminatory U.S. anti-dumping duties placed on Korean exports of
steel and semiconductors.  Korea won both of the steel cases it initiated. 
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U.S. Visa Policies.  South Koreans’ complaints about U.S. visa policies tend
to fall into two categories.27  First, some Korean government officials, Korean
businesses, the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, and Korean-Americans
have questioned why South Korea is not a participant in the U.S. Visa Waiver
Permanent Program, under which foreigners traveling from certain countries are
permitted to travel to the U.S. as temporary visitors, without having the immigration
documents normally required for entry.28  Among the statutory requirements for
countries to participate in the U.S. visa waiver program is that the country must have
a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for two years — averaging no more than 2%
over both years and not exceeding 2.5% in any one year.  According to State
Department officials, South Korea’s visa refusal rates have consistently been over
this threshold.  U.S. State Department officials attribute the rise in Korea’s refusal
rates since 1997 to the increased number of Koreans illegally seeking to find work
in the United States.
The second, and more recent, category of complaints are lodged against new
U.S. visa policies implemented since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States, particularly requirements for mandatory interviews, fingerprinting, and
greater scrutiny of business travelers for possible technology transfer risks.  Like
citizens of many other countries, Koreans particularly have objected to the
fingerprinting, which some Koreans have likened to requirements imposed upon
them during Japan’s thirty-five-year occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the first
half of the 20th Century.  According to the U.S. embassy in Seoul, U.S. businesses
lost hundreds of millions of dollars from Korean students, tourists, and
businesspeople who could not or would not travel to the United States because of the
new requirements.29  South Korean government officials reportedly raised the visa
issue in the June 2004 quarterly trade talks with the United States. 
Institutionalizing the U.S.-ROK Economic
Relationship?
Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations.  For several years, the United
States and South Korea have been discussing a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
BITs are designed to improve the climate for foreign investors — typically  by
committing the signatories to prohibit discrimination against foreign investors — by
establishing dispute settlement procedures and by protecting foreign investors from
performance requirements, restrictions on transferring funds, and arbitrary
expropriation.  The United States has signed over 30 BITs, primarily with countries
undergoing significant economic reforms.  The U.S. and South Korea last held formal
negotiations in 1999.  The major stumbling block is Korea’s so-called “screen
quotas,” which require that  theaters fill 40% of their screen time with Korean
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movies.  The U.S. side has made a loosening and eventual elimination of the quotas
preconditions for signing a BIT, which some in South Korea are eager to complete
in order to turn to their next agenda item:  a U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement
(FTA).  In a sign that the BIT talks may be restarted, in mid-June 2004, the South
Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism, previously a staunch backer of maintaining
the screen quota, reportedly told a gathering of South Korean film industry
executives that it was time to consider loosening the quotas.30
A Possible Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  In recent years,
there have been some calls for the United States and Korea to negotiate a free trade
agreement, which would lower trade barriers between the two countries.  The idea
enjoys the support of the American business community in Korea, and many Korean
businesses operating in the United States. In the previous two Congresses, Senator
Max Baucus introduced legislation (S. 944 in the 107th Congress and S. 1869 in 106th
Congress) authorizing FTA negotiations with Seoul.  No legislative action was taken
on either attempt.  To date, no formal government-to-government discussions have
been held over an FTA.  USTR Robert Zoellick has said that the United States would
be interested in an FTA, but that before negotiations begin progress must be made in
outstanding bilateral trade irritants, particularly in opening South Korea’s agricultural
market.31 
  
In 2001, at the request of the Senate Finance Committee, the International Trade
Commission conducted a fact-finding investigation on the likely economic impact
of a South Korea-U.S. FTA.  The ITC’s final report estimated that within four years
after implementation of an FTA, U.S. exports to Korea would increase by 54% while
U.S. imports would rise by 21%.   In the short run, the biggest beneficiaries would
likely be those industries in both countries that face high initial trade barriers.  On the
U.S. side, the ITC found that bilateral agricultural exports would increase by more
than 200%.  For Korea, the ITC projected that textiles and apparel exporters would
see their shipments to the U.S. rise by 125%.32  Thus, the report implied that the
FTA’s potential benefits would be greatly diluted if these politically sensitive  sectors
were excluded.33
Overall, the ITC estimated that within four years after implementation of an
FTA, U.S. GDP would increase by approximately 0.2%, while Korean GDP would
rise by 0.7% as a result of an FTA.34  An earlier study by the Institute for
International Economics (IIE), found similar effects for the U.S. economy, but had
a wider band for the increase on Korean GDP, which was projected in the 0.4%-2.0%
range.  As in the ITC study, the IIE report found that most of the benefits to U.S.
firms would derive from increased access to Korea’s market.  In contrast, the IIE
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projected that most of Korea’s gains from an FTA would stem not from preferential
access to the U.S. market but from improvements in the allocative efficiency of the
Korean economy brought about the trade reforms required by an FTA.35  In 2004, the
Korean National Assembly ratified Korea’s first FTA, with Chile, after protracted
parliamentary deliberations.  Korea also is negotiating FTAs with Japan and
Singapore.
Recent Legislation in the 108th Congress
S. 1592 (Lieberman)
The Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 calls on the U.S. government to
monitor and take action against South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, and other
countries, that are “engaged most egregiously in currency manipulation.”  Introduced
September 8, 2003; referred to Senate Finance Committee.
